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"Under the Spreading Chestnut Tree"
Accountants' Legal Liability—
A Historical Perspective
Paul J. Ostling*
Arthur Young & Co.

I. Introduction
It is difficult these days to read a week's worth of newspaper financial
sections and business magazines withoutfinding an article, sometimes lurid,
discussing the role and liabilities of the public auditor. Those within the
profession often view this attention as an undeserved, new development.
Certainly the frequency, scope, and magnitude of civil suits against auditors
have grown. There has, however, always been a close connection between the
legal liabilities imposed upon auditors and the standards adopted by the
profession—as well as its perceived scope and responsibilities of practice.
This paper describes some present and recent legal challenges facing the
profession, their historical perspective, and predictions as to possible future
developments. Taken in perspective, current attacks on the profession may be
no more than a maturation and reevaluation of the auditor's standards and role.
As the investor community becomes more sophisticated in its appreciation of
the limitations in the auditor's role pursuant to generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS), and better understands the "gray areas" where generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) permit more than one treatment of
certainfinancial transactions, a credibility gap looms. To reduce the gap, the
courts and legislators are attempting to regulate the profession and impose
more "watchdog" responsibilities. Because of the gap, insurance companies
and bright young graduates, fearful, respectively, of large legal judgments and
less rewarding career opportunities may avoid the accounting profession.
Counter-productive activities of the professionals themselves and their
representative associations may be complicating this trend. Nearly predatory
competition drives the price of audit services downward at the very same time
that the attendant risks are skyrocketing. Legislative "overseers" lambast the
profession, often inaccurately and unjustifiably, but the associations often seem
timid by comparison in their response. Public auditors must act quickly and
affirmatively to resolve these conflicts in order to assure the future growth and
profitability of the profession.
* The views expressed herein are those of the author individually.

II. Development of Standards and Liabilities
It is now settled that the role and responsibilities of the public auditor
include the supply of accuratefinancial information to facilitate the function of
the free markets, including the securities markets. This was not always
accepted by the profession as such. Indeed, our predecessors in practice
initially viewed their audience as including only their direct, paying clients.
Auditors vociferously resisted the expansion of their role and responsibilities,
and changes were frequently the result of litigation losses and/or government
intervention.

A. Our United Kingdom Roots
While there are reports of "auditors" having counting responsibilities
during biblical times, the analysis of the evolution of accountants' legal liabilities
must commence in the United Kingdom. It comes as no great surprise to even
the less scholarly students of the profession that the modern auditing
profession as we know it evolved in England and Scotland.
— Laws permitting the formation of corporate entities (whose ownership was
represented by and transferable through stock) and the concept of "limited
liability" (that a shareholder is liable to the extent of his capital invested in
purchasing stock, but is not "personally liable") were passed there during the
1840's and 1850's. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 18441 required that a
"full and fair'' balance sheet be sent to shareholders before their meetings and
filed with the Registrar of Companies. Auditors (who were to be non-officeholding stock-holders) were required to be appointed to report on the balance
sheet. There were no meaningful legal requirements or standards as to the
form or content of the balance sheets or the manner of the conduct of the
auditors' reviews. There were no enforcement provisions relating to the
content or thefiling of the balance sheet with the Registrar of Companies. The
1844 Act should not be thought of as anything approaching our own federal or
state securities laws.
Because the balance sheets were standardless and the "audits" were a
perfunctory checking of support for disbursements there was little faith by
third parties in either the fullness or fairness of the balance sheets.2 The
balance sheet requirement was dropped in 1856,3 and the matter of accounting
and auditing was left up to the corporations themselves. It was not until 1900
that all registrants under the Companies Act were again required to have
annual audits conducted. In 1907, they were again required tofile their balance
sheets.4
In thefifty-year interim, however, certain industry-specific requirements
were enacted. During the late 1860's railroad companies were required to
publish their accounts; during the 1870's banks were required to audit their
accounts and gas companies to publish theirs; and in the early 1880's electrical
companies were to publish their accounts. These industries were regarded as
special because of the public trust in their operations, or the speculative nature
of their early operations. In the meantime, the accounting profession was
beginning to organize and establish standards. In Scotland, the Society of
Accountants in Edinburgh was granted a royal charter in 1854. In England, a
charter was granted to The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
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Wales in 1880. Two other associations were formed in Scotland, and in England
the Society of Incorporated Accountants and Auditors was formed in 1885. In
both Scotland and England these groups agreed upon uniform examinations for
new members (designated chartered accountant or C.A.) as well as apprenticeship programs.5
The British audit during the 1880's evolved as having the primary goal of
uncovering fraud. Detailed bookkeeping-type examinations reviewed the numbers in the books of account. Courses in study evolved in auditing, and a
textbook was prepared. Customs developed for the preparation of the auditors'
"certification". The Scots and English auditors had acquired some status and
had established some commonly accepted auditing and accounting "standards"
by 1900, when all registered companies were required to have audits
conducted. For example, the use of the term "certificate" to describe the
report, and the representation thatfinancial statements "present fairly" were
English customs. This is not to say, however, that auditors' "legal liabilities"
had been yet fully examined.
For the most part the manner of report and the procedures applied were
determined by the corporation's articles of incorporation and the engagement
contract between the auditor and the client. In most cases the company's
articles required that the balance sheet be "full and fair" and prepared to
display the "true and correct" picture of the company's "state of affairs."
This requirement was based upon the model articles of incorporation appended
to the 1856 Companies Act.6 The earliest reported losing cases involving
auditors arose in England prior to 1900, and focused upon whether the
auditor's certificate had adequately communicated the "state of affairs" of the
company.7
In the case of Leeds Estate, the auditor's certificate for seven years, 1874
through 1880, said:
I certify that I have examined the above accounts andfind them to be a
true copy of those [shown] in the books of the company.
While escaping damages because that statute of limitations had run, the
auditor was found guilty of negligence to its client for failing to actually go
behind the numbers presented by management to ascertain their accuracy.
In In re London the auditor's 1892 certificate said:
We have examined the . . . balance-sheet and compared it with the
books of the company; and we certify that it is a correct summary of the
accounts therein recorded. The value of the assets as [shown] on the
balance-sheet is dependent upon their realization.
Again the auditor was found liable for negligence in breaching its duty to its
clients—the shareholders—because the Court felt the words "subject to
realization" was not a qualification which adequately communicated the company's true state of affairs.
Thus, by 1900, some rudimentary legal reporting requirements had been
imposed upon their clients, and the court had just begun to impose a legal duty
3

upon auditors to carry out an audit in accordance with their engagement
contracts. The duty was a narrow one by today's standards, but the auditors
gave those clients some level of comfort with regard to detectingfraud which
was on the clients' books. To be sure, the primary purposes and benefits from
the audit were to assist the client's management in monitoring its financial
matters, ward off defalcations, and securefinancial supportfrom bankers.

B. Migration to America
In 1776, America was essentially an agrarian society. While the revolution
removed the yoke of British governmental rule, thefinancial connections which
had already been formed by Britishfinanciers provided much of the capital for
the American industrial revolution. American states passed laws permitting the
formation of corporations. The industrial revolution, corporate growth, and
British investment all led to the birth of the accounting profession in America—
but as a child of the United Kingdom practice.
Individuals, such as Arthur Young, came to America in growing numbers
during the 1880's and 1890's to look after the interests of English investors,
and then began their own practices here—evolving intofirms of accountants.
Englishfirms, such as Price Waterhouse & Co., sent agents of thefirm to the
United States to conduct examinations on behalf of English investors. By 1900,
Price Waterhouse's activities were significant enough here that Arthur Lowes
Dickenson came to manage them. A young English auditor on his staff at the
time, George O. May, succeeded Dickenson as senior partner in America in
1911, remained in the post until 1940, and had an incredible influence upon the
manner of practice and the development of standards in America. An American
of the day, Colonel Robert Montgomery, was also an early leader in establishing
the American practice. He was a CPA, a lawyer, a militaryfigure, a Columbia
University professor, and president of the associations which eventually
became the AICPA. In 1905, he edited thefirst American textbook on auditing
(called, simply Auditing) which was, naturally, an adaptation of the leading
English text of the day.
In 1896, New York was the first state to pass a law designating the
professional title of Certified Public Accountant. Other states quickly followed.
Likewise, uniform tests for CPAs were developed early in this century.
Through this period, however, the American practice, in terms of procedures
and process, was little more than an extension of the Scots and English
methodologies. Indeed, most of the leading U.S.firms were led by Scots and
Englishmen until the early 1960's. For at least thefirst quarter of the century,
the bulk of audit "staffmen" were importedfrom the United Kingdom. Thus,
as in England, the focus in America was initially upon auditing as a report to
management rather than as a review of management's report to investors and
lenders of its own stewardship. Much of the development of the auditor's legal
liabilities over the past 53 years has focused on this change in the audit's
emphasis to a review of the managment'sfinancial report to third-party users
of financial information.
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C. Early Development of Standards in America
Pressure for a change in emphasis in the purpose of financial reporting and
auditing began early in this century. Before the great stock market crash of
1929, ownership of stocks and bonds became more than a game for the
wealthy. Many small, individual purchasers—relatively unsophisticated and in
large measurefinancing their purchases with borrowed money—entered the
stock market. Investors wanted more and more accuratefinancial information,
and critics wanted more standardization of accounting and reporting practices.
The new investing audience was more interested "in the income statement and
less in the balance sheet." 8 Despite this need for more standardization,
practices varied substantially on subjects such as depreciation and reporting of
income statements. Critics of the profession complained of the lack of
standardization, the inadequacy of financial information, and the manipulative
practices which abounded.9
Three developments between 1916 and 1934 went far in the United States
to formulate standards and define the duties and liabilities of auditors. In 1916
the Secretary of Commerce (William Redfield), the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) requested the American Institute
of Accountants (AIA) to prepare a memorandum on balance sheet audits. Since
many of the audits conducted had been balance sheet audits done without actual
observation of inventories and assets, they were concerned about the integrity
of financial information of the day.
The AIA committee, which included George May and Robert Montgomery,
adopted a Price Waterhouse internal memorandum entitled Memorandum on
Balance Sheet Audits. This memorandum was approved and accepted by the
FTC and the FRB and published initially in 1917 in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin. It was revised and republished several times before 1930. The AIA
itself revised the memorandum and published it in 1936 as Examination of
Financial Statements by Independent Public Accountants. While this effort
resulted in some standardization and definition of the auditor's role, it still did
not require observation or testing of inventories or the confirmation of
receivables. It would be left to a major scandal for that to occur.
The second major occurrence in the development of standards began from
a 1927 AIA initiative, when it approached, but was turned down by the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), to jointly developfinancial reporting requirements for NYSE registrants. After the 1929 crash, the NYSE reversed itself
and asked for the AIA's help in developing accounting principles. George May
was called into service yet again to chair two separate committees to cooperate
with exchanges and develop accounting principles.
May's committees did not support the adoption of a set of specific
directives of accounting treatment, but suggested in 1932 "very broad limits
[of accounting treatments within which reporting companies would make]
disclosure of the methods employed and consistency in their application from
year to year. " 1 0 In 1933 the NYSE required all new registrants to have audited
annualfinancial reports, but made no requirements for disclosure of accounting
methods. May's committees published a pamphlet in 1934 called "Audits of
Corporate Accounts" and recommended a new form of audit report which used
the words: "fairly present, in accordance with accepted principles of account5

ing consistently maintained." In 1940 the reference to "accepted principles of
accounting" became "generally accepted accounting principles." From 1934
on, the profession recommended that companies choose accounting methods
"within very broad limits" and identify them in thefinancial statements. Thus
the concept of GAAP was born—with the built-inflexibilities upon which many
of today's critics harp.
The third major occurrence in the period was the enactment of the
Securities Act of 193311 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12 Before
these enactments, no laws in the U.S. required auditedfinancial statements for
"public companies." When initially passed, the Securities Act was enforced by
the FTC, which quickly published regulations for the determination of independence of auditors and uniform accounting rules. The Securities Act requires
registration of new securities via a registration "statement" including financial
statements certified by an independent accountant. The 1933 Act imposes
significant legal liabilities upon experts identified in the registration statements
for false statements in the portions of the report as to which they are experts.
It also prohibits fraud in connection with the sale of new securities.
The 1934 Act is an overlay beyond the 1933 Act which created the SEC to
enforce both Acts. It prohibits false statements in connection with the sale of
securities, and was particularly significant in its impact upon public auditors in
the context of private securities fraud suits. The 1933 and 1934 Acts and the
regulations promulgated thereunder clearly established concrete standards,
roles, and liabilities for American auditors.

D. The Agony of Defeat
The late 1930's marked the beginning of litigation in the United States
which had direct impact upon the duties and liabilities of auditors. This paper
cannot relate all cases which have historical significance, but several have had
"landmark" results upon the profession.

1. Testing Inventories and Assets
The McKesson & Robbins case is the most significant "early" auditing case
in America. Philip Musica, alias Frank Donald Coster, was a con man. His first
scrape with American justice in 1909 resulted in conviction and a prison
sentence for bribing customs officials and preparing fraudulent invoices and
customs documents. Within three years of leaving prison, he was caught for
bilking twenty-two banks on loans obtained with collateral he did not own. He
spent three years in prison and was placed on probation.
In 1920, Musica claimed to be in the drug business but was actually a
prohibition bootlegger. In 1923, he became the sole owner of Girard &
Company, a manufacturer of drugs. Despite being sole owner, he hired Price
Waterhouse to conduct audits. He studied auditing procedures and noted that
auditors did not observe physical inventories unless requested to do so. In
1926, withfinancial support from bankers, he purchased McKesson & Robbins
which was merged with his company.
In December 1938, Musica was confronted by his treasurer and director
who had uncovered fraud, waste, mismanagement and inclusion of fictitious
inventories and assets exceeding $10 million. A receiver was appointed by a
6

federal judge, and that same day the ever present George May of Price
Waterhouse met with the company's executives and assured them that, as far
as he knew, the books were in order. Eleven days later Musica committed
suicide. Investigation revealed that on stated assets of over $87 million, $10
million in inventory and $9 million of receivables were fictitious.
Price Waterhouse settled the trustee's claim by refunding $522,402.29
representing five years' audit fees. The SEC commenced an investigation
which exposed the lack of agreement among auditors as to what the appropriate
audit procedures were with regard to inventories and receivables. In the wake
of the scandal, but before the SEC could issue its final report, the AIA
established a committee in January 1939, to examine audit procedures. In
October 1939, the AIA issued its Committee on Auditing Procedures'
Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 1: Extensions of Auditing Procedure,
which required observation and testing of physical inventory and confirmation
of receivables.
The SEC's report, which was issued in 194013 contained the following:
• Price Waterhouse was found to be derelict in failing to follow
procedures which a diligent auditor would have used in the circumstances, and which were called for in the authoritative works on
auditing(e.g., Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice (1934), p.
157 and 182).
• While auditors claimed not to be insurers of financial health, "discovery of gross overstatement in the accounts is a major purpose of an
audit
"
• Management's activities are within the scope of an audit, so auditors
should be elected by shareholders.
• The profession did well to publish SAP No. 1, but it should also
distinguish between auditing "standards" and "procedures."
• Regulation S-X was amended so that the auditor's report states
whether the audit was made in accordance with appropriate GAAS.
The profession responded by having the AIA Committee on Auditing
Procedure prepare a statement defining audit standards. In 1947, the AIA
published a brochure incorporating the Committee's memorandum "Tentative
Statement of Auditing Standards—Their Generally Accepted Significance and
Scope." We now know this as Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1. The
statement distinguished between standards (which deal with "quality of
performance and objectives to be attained") and procedures (which "relate to
acts to be performed"). While over the years the interpretations have been
amended from time to time, the three original auditing standards ("General
Standards," "Standards of Field Work" and "Standards of Reporting")
remain the same.
The McKesson & Robbins case is a graphic illustration of how scandal and
litigation can result directly in long-term advances in the definition of a
profession's role, standards, and legal liabilities. Since this case resulted
directly in SAP NO. 1 and SAS No. 1, it is difficult tofind a more seminal
example.
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2. Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass "Go"
Perhaps the most image-shattering cases for the profession have been
those which resulted in criminal convictions for independent auditors. Recently,
in connection with a federal investigation and indictments relating to a major
financial scandal, a picture of a Big Eight partner being led to his arraignment in
handcuffs appeared on page 1 of the New York Times Business Section. More
recently, a managing partner of a Florida practice office of a major accounting
firm pleaded guilty to several counts of fraud and criminal securities conduct,
including taking a payment from ESM Securities and giving a clean opinion in
the face of fictitious collateral securing millions of dollars of ESM's securities
transactions. In the same case, the company's lawyer (the son-in-law of ESM's
major benefactor) committed suicide. The lurid headlines created by these
criminal financial scandals have a far-reaching impact upon the public's
perception of and respect (or lack thereof) for the profession.
Three such criminal cases have had far-reaching impact upon the profession's self-image and its view of the attendant duties and liabilities. In 1968, a
senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate of Lybrand, Ross Bros.
& Montgomery were convicted (after a jury trial) of mail fraud and securities
fraud for certifying the 1962financial statements of Continental Vending
Corporation. The main defense was that thefinancial statements were in
compliance with GAAP. The trial court held, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed 14 that compliance with GAAP was not a
complete defense against a charge of criminally certifying a false and misleading
financial statement, and that auditors must report major management misconduct.
The Second Circuit took its task of passing on criminal liability of
professionals quite seriously:
While every criminal conviction is important to the defendant, there is a
special poignancy and a corresponding responsibility on reviewing
judges when, as here, the defendants have been men of blameless lives
and respected members of a learned profession. . . .
In a widely quoted passage, the court enunciated an accountant's legal
responsibility to investigate management dishonesty:
[I]t simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to disclose
what he knows when he has reason to believe that, to a material extent,
a corporation is being operated not to carry out its business in the
interest of all the stockholders but for the private benefit of its
president. For a court to say that all this is immaterial as a matter of law
if only such loans are thought to be collectible would be to say that
independent accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishonesty by a high corporate officer. If certification does not at least imply
that the corporation has not been looted by insiders so far as the
accountants know, or, if it has been, that the diversion has been made
good beyond peradventure (or adequately reserved against) and effective steps taken to prevent a recurrence, it would mean nothing, and
the reliance placed on it by the public would be a snare and a
dilution. . . .
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The defendants were fined and placed on probation. In 1972, President
Nixon pardoned them.
In 1974, a partner and an audit supervisor were convicted after a jury trial
for criminal violations of the securities law by making false statements in a 1969
proxy statement for National Student Marketing (NSM). On appeal, the
conviction of the partner was affirmed, while the supervisor's was reversed. 15
The partner was sentenced to imprisonment for one year andfined $10,000.
The jail sentence was suspended to 60 days.
The charges centered upon NSM's policy of recognizing revenue which
was selected by the partner and based upon the percentage-of-completion
method. NSM was recognizing revenue when it allegedly received "commitments" onfixed-fee contracts to participate in marketing programs developed
by NSM which were aimed at the "youth market." NSM's utilization of the
method, and its decisions as to when it had "commitments" (i.e. recognizing
revenue on "unbilled accounts receivable") resulted in overstating "net
sales" by approximately $1 million and reporting "net earnings" of $702,270 in
its 1968 Annual Report when there were in fact no earnings at all. NSM
experienced an incredible stock price rise (from $6 to $80 in less than two
years) and used the stock to make a series of acquisitions.
After selecting the percentage-of-completion method for NSM's 1968
financial statements, the partner instructed the supervisor to check on the
commitments. The supervisor did so, but in a haphazard manner by telephone.
No written verifications were sought or received. The partner permitted NSM
to include $1.7 million of such commitments as unbilled receivables for 1968
and this in turn permitted NSM to show a profit instead of a loss. The footnotes
to the annual report'sfinancial statements did not disclose the "flimsy" nature
of the commitments.
Withinfive months of the publication of the 1968financial statements, NSM
had to write off" $1 million of the $1.7 million of commitments. When the
auditors learned of the circumstances of the write-off and the periods they
related to, they netted the reduced earnings against a favorable extraordinary
tax item instead of reducing earnings and sales for the prior period. Thus, the
auditors helped to conceal the actual write-off of profits. NSM then published
the Proxy Statement for the nine months following 1968 without disclosing the
problems with the earlier period.
The Second Circuit noted that the partner's action in allowing bookings on
commitments for 1968 "was contrary to sound accounting practice," 16 and
after discovering the bogus nature of them "[h]onesty should have impelled
[him] to disclose" the problems in the updated footnotes in the Proxy
Statement. The Second Circuit then enunciated what is now called the
"suspicious inquiry doctrine."
Shortly after the Natelli conviction, three independent auditors were
convicted in the aftermath of the Equity Funding Corporation of America
securities scandal. The three were the partner in charge and two audit
managers of Wolfson, Weiner, Ratloff & Lapin which had been merged into
Seidman and Seidman in 1972. After a jury trial, the three were convicted of
multiple counts of securities fraud and filing false SEC documents. The
conviction was upheld on appeal.17 The Equity Funding scandal, which involved
widespread use of computers to perpetrate a massive fraud and the spectacle
9

of issuing new insurance policies to dead people to make Equity Funding's
growth track look continuous, was perhaps the most publicized securities
scandal of the 1960's and 1970's. Books have been written about the case.
Careers of attorneys were made while careers of investment advisors and
accountants were destroyed.
These cases, and cases like them, should stand as a beacon for the
profession signifying a line beyond which one cannot go for one's client.
Moreover, they clearly demonstrate that auditors are not exempt from criminal
liability.

3. Expanding Liability to Clients—The "Adverse Interest"
Analysis
Even as criticism of the accounting profession by governmental representatives, investors, customers of failed banks andfinancial services institutions,
and the courts grows, the profession's own clients are expanding the auditor's
responsibilities and liabilities. Thefinancial statements of a company are, legally
and under the accounting literature, management's reports of the company's
financial transactions. It often comes as a rude awakening then, when, after the
client's officers and directors have set accounting policy, prepared the financial
statements, and represented them to be true and accurate to the auditor, the
corporate client disclaims responsibility for the active fraud of its own officers
and directors, and sues the auditor for negligence in failing to discover and/or
disclose thatfraud. There was a time when clients were unable to make these
suits stick, but those days are gone.
The early cases concerning the allocation of blame for financial dishonesty
between the client and the auditor often arose where employees made
defalcations of the client's assets. The issue was generally addressedfrom the
perspective of whether the client should bear responsibility for failure to
properly supervise its employee, or whether the auditor should bear the loss
for negligence in not detecting the employee's dishonesty. Under ancient
common law theories of "agency" or respondeat superior the principal/
employer is responsible for the negligent or wrongful acts committed in the
course of the agent/employee's employment. When the employee actually
steals from his employer, the courts have ruled the illegal deed to be outside
the "scope of employment" (i.e., it is "adverse" to the "interests" of the
employer), and held the agency/respondeat superior doctrines inapplicable to
place the blame on the employer. Rather, in these cases the courts generally
adopted the old contributory negligence standard. Under this approach, even if
the auditor were negligent in detecting thefraud, there would be no liability for
the loss where the client was "contributorially negligent" and thus could have
avoided the loss by the exercise of reasonable care in supervising its own
employee.18 Even in these cases, auditors were sometimes found in "breach of
contract" and had to return their fees to the client.
This standard, which was the most favorable for auditors, began to be
reduced when courts overlaid a requirement that the auditor would not avoid
liability unless the client's contributing negligence somehow contributed to the
auditor's inability to detect the employee's fraud. 19 In such cases, the courts
acknowledged a belief that part of the function of the audit was "detecting
10

defalcations which the [company's] negligence ha[d] made possible. . . ."
Thus, there was no automatic defense for the auditor just because the client's
negligence in supervising the errant employee permitted the loss to occur, but
there was a defense when the client's negligence permitted the auditor's
negligence or somehow undercut the auditor's ability to perform its job.
The tightening of the noose around auditors began in a series of cases
which adopted a variant of the "adverse interest" analysis. First, in Shapiro v.
Glekel, 20 the court utilizing the modified negligence test described above
refused to dismiss a case against the auditors of Beck Industries. Beck had
become a conglomerate by acquiring numerous companies in the 1960's. The
president and chairman of Beck's executive board had fraudulently prepared
financial statements which overstated assets and revenues. These inflated
statements helped keep Beck's stock price high, and the stock and fraudulent
statements were used in the acquisitions. Beck went bankrupt. The trustee for
the estate sued the auditors on behalf of Beck arguing that the "outside"
directors would never have authorized the aggressive acquisition program had
they known Beck's truefinancial condition.
The court found that however negligent or unlawful the conduct of Beck's
officers had been, it had not prevented the auditors from performing their
audit. In analyzing the case it is difficult to see how the actions of the president
and his cohorts were not on behalf of Beck and in the scope of employment.
They did not steal from Beck per se, rather they launched a scheme which
aggrandized the company and allowed it to acquire new assets (although surely
their own stock holdings and positions were benefited as well). If the auditors
were able to utilize the respondeat superior argument, they would certainly have
been able to avoid or significantly cushion liability.
To date the courts have refused to permit auditors to use such arguments.
A prime example is In re Investors Funding Corp., 21 where the company's
officers' attempted bribes led directly to the company's failure. In suing the
auditors after the company failed, the trustee claimed that the officers' fraud
and mismanagement would not have continued "but for" the auditor's actions.
The auditor staked its defense on the claim that it was a victim of the officers'
fraud, and not responsible for it. The court referred to the principles of
respondeat superior and observed that the adverse interest test (which lets the
employer off the hook when the employee's acts are "adverse" to the
employer") does not apply when the employee is acting at least partly for the
employer's benefit "even though the agent's primary interest is inimical to that
of the principal."
Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss the trustee's case and found
that the officers' scheme to keep the company afloat was not even partly for the
benefit of the company. It accepted the trustee's allegations that the officers'
false financial statements prolonged the company's "artificial solvency," and
this was "predominantly antagonistic" to the company's interests. The court
held that this benefited only the officers and not the company.
Auditors have had a bright moment in the interim, such as in a case where
the court found a company's officers had turned the company into "an engine
of theft against outsiders" and refused to permit recovery on behalf of the
company against its auditors. 22 But for the most part, the courts have refused
to follow such logic, and refuse to saddle a client with the fraudulent or even
11

criminal acts of its own officers and directors, and do permit recovery against
auditors. 23
An interesting irony has developed with regard to the auditor's legal
liabilities as opposed to those of the officers and directors of America's larger
public companies. The former have come to be regarded as having a higher
standard of diligence and care—they are the "watchdogs"24—than the officers
and directors of their clients who have the underlying duty to honestly and
faithfully account to the public for their stewardship. Auditors have not been
permitted to avoid the acts of their own employees who have been found to
have hadfraudulent intent (even where no partners have such intent) again,
because the special duties of auditors require them to be even more vigilant in
monitoring their employees.25
In essence, the courts have permitted corporations whose downfall is
attributable to their own leaders to disclaim responsibility because the leaders'
acts were so wrongful as to be "ultra vires"—even though the corporation may
have been aggrandized, incurred increased assets, and grown in share price as
a result of those acts before the acts were discovered. The very shareholders
and creditors of the corporations have then been permitted to collect millions of
dollars in damagesfrom auditors and their insurers to pay for the ensuing drop
in share price, the debts, and the shortfalls created by the wrongdoers. On the
contrary, the courts have not permitted auditing firms to escape liability where
the acts of partners or junior auditors are clearly and undeniably contrary to the
audit firms' overall interests and their own published policies and procedures. 26
Has the pendulum swung too far? Should corporations, their shareholders and
creditors (whofrequently have significant corporate governance power through
debt covenants and agreements) share in the responsibility for ensuring that
their corporate leaders prepare and release accuratefinancial statements?

III. Expansion of the "Protected" Class
The subject of the expansion of class of those who will be permitted to bring
suit against the auditor always begins with a discussion of Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 27 even though Ultramares was not thefirst case to restrict the class of
those entitled to sue an auditor.28 In Ultramares, Touche, Niven & Co. was
retained to prepare and report on the balance sheet of Fred Stern & Co. as of
December 31, 1923, as they had done for three prior years. Fred Stern
financed his company through extensive borrowings, and Touche knew how
Sternfinanced the company. Touche was aware that Stern would show its
certified balance sheet to creditors. Touche supplied Stern with 32 copies of
the balance sheet, each as a counterpart original. There was, however, no
specific agreement with Touche as to who would see the balance sheets or how
many times they might be used. There was no identification of Ultramares, no
communication between Touche and Ultramares, and Ultramares had not been
a Stern creditor in earlier years. The subject of who would look at the balance
sheet was left indefinite.
The audit wasfinished and a net worth of more than $1 million was indicated
in the balance sheet. Touche issued a clean opinion. The books had been
falsified, and Stern was actually insolvent. Ultramares saw the balance sheet
and extended substantial credit to Stern before discovery of the insolvency. It
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sued Touche claiming the audit was negligent or fraudulent. There was no
indication of fraudulent intent ("scienter") and the trial judge dismissed the
fraud claim, but the jury found Touche negligent. The judge granted Touche a
dismissal judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the judge's holding and held Touche negligent.
On appeal, New York's highest court reversed and found for Touche. In an
eloquent opinion the famous Judge Cardozo rejected "the assault on the citadel
of privity." "Privity" is the close relationship which exists between parties to
a contract. Cardozo was concerned to prevent the expansion of liability for
"negligent words" from growing to duplicate an action in fraud in the absence
of the "indispensable element" of scienter. In this sense he was four decades
ahead of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder. 29
Dispensing with the issue of fraud since there was none, Cardozo turned to
negligence. He held that auditors cannot be liable for negligence to third parties
where the auditor could only foresee the third-party plaintiff in a general way.
This was the case where plaintiff's loans to the audit client were within a "wide
range of transactions in which a certificate of audit might be expected to play a
part." Cardozo refused to unnecessarily enlarge the class of third parties
which might sue auditors:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether
aflaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.
Judge Cardozo made it clear that he had no intention of "emancipating"
auditorsfrom liability. He simply would not extend it to an "indefinite'' group of
third parties in the absence of more than mere negligence. Much of what has
happened in the auditor's legal liability during the last fifty years can be viewed
as ebbs andflows in the application of the privity doctrine.

A. Privity and Unaudited Financial Statements
Conflicting opinions as to the range of accountants' liability have led courts
to issue confusing decisions where unaudited statements are involved. In a
number of cases, auditors have been found liable to their client for non-audit
work, 30 and to the public in actions by the SEC or criminal authorities.31 In
Natelli, supra, the court adopted what has come to be referred to as the
"suspicious inquiry" standard in connection with accountants involved in
preparing unaudited financial statements. The auditor has a duty to investigate
figures known by him to be suspicious, and to insist upon corrections in
published reports, even though no audit is conducted.
In cases involving nonaudited statements, the courts frequently frame the
critical issue as the question of extending accountants' liability to third parties
who are not in privity. One line of case law continues to accept the Ultramares
approach, while other courts take issue with Ultramares and generally rely on
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) standard in assessing the
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extent of the accountants' liability. Section 552 of the Restatement rejects
Ultramares to the extent that privity is the sole definitional criterion of duty.
The Restatement standard for negligent misrepresentation seems to be
"knowing reliance" rather than "reasonable foreseeability," the latter being
the hallmark of the negligence determination in other areas of tort law. Courts
using this analysis tofind liability focus on whether the accountant knew the
third party would rely upon thefinancial statement.
In Bonhiver v. Graff, 32 the Minnesota Supreme Court found an accountant
liable to a third party, a receiver of an insurance company, for failing to discover
an embezzlement during a write-up engagement that was never completed.
The court based its decision on the fact that the accountant had audited the firm
in a prior year and was aware of its poorfinancial condition. When the
accountant personally showed his workpapers andfigures to state examiners
who relied on such data, such knowledge on the defendants' part "rendered
them liable for their negligence" in the preparation of those workpapers. For
authority, the court analogized to the Natelli case. For additional authority
Restatement § 552 was applied.
A classic example of the Restatement reasoning is in Ryan v. Kanne. 33
There, the Iowa Supreme Court dealt a blow to the concept of privity,
increasing considerably the accountant's potential liability to third parties.
Kanne owned and operated certain businesses, including lumber companies,
which had incurred considerable indebtedness. He sought the services of an
accountant at the insistence of the officers of a creditor. The accountants were
to determine the true amount of the accounts payable. The accountant
submittedfinancal statements clearly marked "unaudited," but an accompanying letter described certain confirmation procedures which the accountants had
undertaken to verify the accuracy of theirfigures. When Kanne Lumber and
Supply, Inc. was incorporated and took over the assets and liabilities of Kanne's
lumber business, it discovered that the accounts payable were incorrect.
The Ryan court looked to Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,34 as establishing the
guiding principle to be followed for determining auditor responsibility in this
context. In Rusch Factors, which involved a certified financial statement, the
federal district court expressed considerable doubt about the wisdom of
Ultramares:
Why should an innocent party be forced to carry the weighty burden of
an accountants' professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more
easily distributed and fairly spread by impositing [sic] it on the
accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the
risk on to its customers, who can in turn pass the costs on to the entire
consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the
cautionary techniques of the accounting profession?
The Ryan court concluded that "the test to be adopted is whether the third
party to whom the accountant owes a duty of care is actually foreseen and a
member of a limited class of persons contemplated." Recovery for negligence
is limited "to persons for whose benefit and guidance the accountant knows the
information is intended." The court approved the more liberal Restatement
position but declined to say whether liability should extend to all foreseeable
third parties.
14

Despite the fact that the statements were clearly labeled "unaudited," the
court was unwilling to accept the accounting profession's concept of unaudited
services, a rejection which was probably attributable to the court's perception
of the public expectation of accountant responsibility in both audit and nonaudit
engagements.
Recently in Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 35 an Indiana corporate creditor
brought a diversity action against a CPA who was a resident of Nebraska. The
plaintiff claimed that financial documents prepared for the debtor were
"recklessly and wantonly prepared" and the accountant knew that the
unaudited, inaccurate statements failed to conform with generally accepted
accounting principles. The court rejected the accountant's motion for summary
judgment on strict Ultramares privity grounds because the case at hand was
"qualitatively distinguishable," and because "in light of the overwhelming and
subsequent erosion of the viability of the Ultramares decision, it is not so
readily apparent that the state courts . . . of Indiana and Nebraska would cling
to the outmoded and restrictive doctrine of privity as a precondition to a finding
of accountant's liability."
The court quoted Ryan and noted that the state courts of Indiana and
Nebraska might choose to follow § 552 of the Restatement as both have
followed the Restatement's positions in other areas.
A second case which relied on the Ryan rationale was Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & CO. 36 General Home Products (GHP) engaged Alexander
Grant to prepare an unaudited financial statement for a twelve-month period
based onfinancial information provided by GHP. Copies of this statement were
submitted by GHP to Spherex to obtain credit. When Spherex subsequently
sustained afinancial loss in its dealing with GHP and sued Alexander Grant, the
latter contended that its liability did not extend to a third party creditor not in
privity.
The court began its analysis by noting that it had previously expressed
disfavor of the privity doctrine in personal injury cases: "Our reluctance to
apply the privity rule has extended to allowing a proper plaintiff to recover for
merefinancial loss resulting from the negligent performance of services."
Furthermore, the court noted a resemblance of this case to cases involving
contract law in that the duty owed by Alexander Grant to Spherex was "not
entirely dissimilar to the duty we have held a promisor owes to an intended
third-party beneficiary." Next, the court analyzed the evolution of the
Ultramares holding and its privity requirement. According to the New
Hampshire court's observation, "judges have not hesitated to permit recovery
where the plaintiff's identity was specifically known to the negligent defendant." The reason for this, the court stated, was that judges are seeking to link
the privity doctrine with Cardozo's "social utility" rationale of protecting
professions from the specter of unlimited liability to a virtually limitless class of
plaintiffs. The real question, said the court, is whether the defendant has some
special reason to anticipate the reliance of the plaintiff.
According to the Spherex court, the second reason for distinguishing the
Ultramares opinion is that it is "a relic of a bygone economic era." Both the
sophistication of modern accounting procedures and the accountant's central
role in thefinancing and investment industry are a far cry from the fledgling
profession in need of judicial protection that existed at the time of Ultramares.
15

Under this court's theory, if the choice is between the reliant third party and
the CPA, the accountant should bear the burdens of legal responsibility. The
court buttressed this reasoning by drawing an analogy between an accountant
and a manufacturer under product liability law. Both are ' 'in the best position to
regulate the effects of [their] conduct by controlling the degree of care
exercised during the performance of [their] professional duties." The court
concluded that the Restatement harmonizes the accountant's contemporary
role and his potential liability, and "represents a reasoned approach to the issue
of professional liability for negligent misrepresentation.''

B. Potential Widespread Liability to Third Parties
In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 37 the issue was phrased as
a broad question: "May an accountant be held liable for the negligent
preparation of an audit report to a third party not in privity who relies on the
report?" The court answered in the affirmative, based on the principles of
Wisconsin negligence law. The defendant accountants in this case regularly
preparedfinancial statements for their client CFA. In November 1975, Citizens
Bank made a loan to CFA after reviewing the statements Timm had prepared.
In early 1977, during the course of preparing CFA'sfinancial statement for the
previous year, Timm's employees discovered that the 1974 and 1975 statements contained a number of material errors totalling over $400,000. Once
informed of these errors, the bank called its loan, resulting in CFA going into
receivership and dissolving.
The court characterized the issue as one of first impression in the state of
Wisconsin. For authority, the court turned to sources such as Rusch Factors,
Ryan, and the Restatement § 552. The court also analogized to a Wisconsin
state case involving an attorney who was held liable to a beneficiary not in
privity for the attorney's negligence in supervising the execution of a will. The
court observed that the imposition of liability would make attorneys and
accountants more careful in the execution of their responsibilities:
Unless liability is imposed, third parties who rely upon the accuracy of
thefinancial statements will not be protected. Unless an accountant can
be held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred.
This "public policy" rationale was the main argument on which the court
"hangs its hat." But there were "additional policy reasons to allow the
imposition of liability." The court feared that if relying third parties, such as
creditors, were not allowed to recover, the cost of credit to the general public
would increase. Accountants, on the other hand, might spread the risk through
the use of liability insurance. The court concluded that accountants' liability to
third parties should be determined under (and limited by) the accepted
principles of Wisconsin state negligence law:
According to these principles, afinding of non-liability will be made only
if there is a strong public policy requiring such afinding. . . . Liability
will be imposed on these accountants for the foreseeable injuries
resulting from their negligent acts unless, under the facts of this
particular case, as a matter of policy to be decided by the court,
recovery is denied on grounds of public policy.
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In Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 38 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
on appealfrom a motion for partial summary judgment that public policy did not
preclude the imposition of liablity on accountants to third parties not in privity.
The plaintiff-shareholders acquired stock in Giant Store Corporation, allegedly
relying on the correctness of the audits done by defendants Touche Ross.
Unfortunately, Giant had manipulated its books by falsely recording assets it did
not own and omitting substantial amounts of accounts payable so the financial
information that Touche had certified in the 1971 and 1972 statements was
incorrect.
While the New Jersey court obviously strained to be methodical and
comprehensive, the reasoning of the opinion is tenuous at many points. The
court engaged in a two-step process to determine the accountant's liability in
this situation. "First, we shall consider whether, in the absence of privity, an
action for negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for economic loss
against the provider of a service.'' The case law in New Jersey is split on this
issue, according to the court. However, the court did note that the requirement
of privity was long ago discarded in product liability cases based on negligence.
After a review of the decisions demonstrating that negligent representations
referring to products may be the basis of liability irrespective of privity, the
court answered the question it had posed:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the
absence of privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's
claim also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for defects in products
arising out of a negligent misrepresentation? If recovery for defective
products may include economic loss, why should such loss not be
compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of
the product and the person making a written representation with intent
that it be relied upon are, respectively, impliedly holding out that the
product is reasonablyfit, suitable and safe and that the representation is
reasonably sufficient, suitable and accurate. The fundamental issue is
whether there should be any duty to respond in damages for economic
loss owed to a foreseeable user neither in privity with the declarant nor
intended by the declarant to be the user of the statement or opinion.
The second question which the courtframed was: "what duty [should] the
auditor . . . bear to best serve the public interest in light of the role of the
auditor in today's economy?" Whether a duty exists, asserted the court, is
ultimately a question of fairness. The judicial analysis that must be made
"involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk,
and the public interest in the proposed solution."
The court appraised the fairness of imposing a duty byfirst reviewing the
auditing function of an accountant, concentrating on how it has changed and
developed over the years. For example: "It is now well recognized that the
audited statements are made for the use of third parties who have no
contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common knowledge
that companies use audits for many proper business purposes. . . . " And:
"The auditor's function has expandedfrom that of a watch-dog for management to an independent evaluator of the adequacy and fairness of financial
statements issued by management to stockholders, creditors, and others."
The court added that despite expanded liability, accountants have been able to
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obtain insurance to cover these risks, leading them to believe that auditors
should be able to "purchase malpractice insurance policies that cover their
negligent acts leading to misstatements relied upon by persons who receive the
auditfrom the company pursuant to a proper business purpose."
When the court tacked on to the previous discussion the ideas that the
imposition of a duty to foreseeable users will "cause accounting firms to
engage in more thorough reviews" and the extent of financial exposure already
has certain "built-in limits" to protect auditors from too much liability, the fate
of the defendant was sealed. The policy arguments made in Rusch Factors Inc.,
that the accountant can more easily carry the burden of liability were repeated
here, but the New Jersey court did add its own philosophy: "it is just and
rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the imposition of negligence
liability, regardless of the context in which it arises." The court believed that
the investor and the general public will benefit in the long run when the liability
of the CPA for negligent misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability
standard.
In applying the above analysis to the facts at hand, the court lookedfirst to
see whether the entity for whom the audit was being made (Giant) used it for a
"proper business purpose." Acccording to the opinion, the defendants should
reasonably expect that their client would distribute thefinancial statements
pursuant to matters relating to its business, particularly given that there was no
limitation in the accountants' opinion. The second requirement for finding
liability is justifiable reliance. "Having inserted the audit in that economic
stream" the defendants should be responsible for "their careless misrepresentations to parties who justifiably relied upon their expert opinions."
Rosenblum is afrightening spectre for the profession. At the same time as
auditors are unable to secure reasonable insurance coverage, courts assume
the fact of that coverage and extend liability even further. 39

C. The Ultramares Court Speaks Again
The New York Court of Appeals had an opportunity to revisit the privity
issue a little less than a year ago in Credit Alliance Corporation v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 40 which considered two different appeals by two different
accounting firms. In the Andersen case, plaintiff Credit Alliance and others
were majorfinancial services companies which financed the purchase of capital
equipment through installment sales or leasing agreements. They provided
financing to L.B. Smith (Smith), a "capital intensive enterprise that regularly
requiredfinancing." Plaintiff began to insist in 1978 that Smith provide audited
financial statements as a pre-condition to further loans. Smith provided its
consolidatedfinancial statements for the years 1976 and 1977 examined and
reported upon by Andersen. In reliance on the statements, plaintiff provided
substantial loans to Smith. Plaintiff continued to receive, rely, and lend on
Smith'sfinancial statements in 1979. Smith petitioned for bankruptcy in 1980
while in default to plaintiff on several million dollars of debt.
Plaintiff sued Andersen alleging negligence andfraud, claiming Andersen
knew or should have known that Smith was showing the statements to it for the
purpose of obtaining loans. Andersen's motion to dismiss the negligence claim
on privity grounds was denied in the lower court. The Appellate Division
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affirmed, finding plaintiff fit into a narrow New York exception to the privity rule
because the plaintiff was a member of the "limited class" entitled to rely on
Andersen's report. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of
Andersen.
In the second case, European American Bank (EAB) sued the firm of
Strauhs & Kaye (S&K) because it made large loans to Majestic Electro
(Majestic) beginning in 1979, allegedly in reliance upon interim and year-end
financial statements reported upon by S&K. S&K allegedly overstated Majestic's inventory and accounts receivable and did not disclose Majestic's poor
internal controls. Majestic went into bankruptcy in 1983 after defaulting on the
loans to EAB. EAB sued S&K, alleging negligence in auditing and that S&K
was familiar with the EAB-Majestic lending relationship and lending agreements, including the fact that EAB was receiving and relying upon the S&K
auditedfinancial statements. Indeed, there were allegations that S&K and EAB
representatives had been in direct oral and written communication during the
entire course of the lending relationship. On S&K's motion in the lower court,
the complaint was dismissed for lack of privity. The Appellate Division reversed
citing the direct communication between S&K and EAB—using a Restatement
§ 552 approach—and observing that S&K specifically knew EAB was relying on
thefinancial statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed in S&K's case.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the Ultramares case and its rationale and
reaffirmed it as expounded upon. The court observed that some relationships
are "so close as to approach privity" and that would be a sufficient predicate
for finding liability, thus the result in the EAB portion of the case. The Court of
Appeals focused on the fact that in Ultramares the accountants only knew
"generally" that third parties would see the report, and nothing had been said
between auditor and client about who would see the reports "or the extent or
number of transactions in which they would be used." The court distinguished
this situation from one where the facts bespeak "an affirmative assumption of a
duty of care to a specific party, for a specific purpose, regardless of whether
there was a contractual relationship." It found the Andersen case to fit the
Ultramares type of fact pattern, while the S&K case fit the latter situation.
The Court of Appeals set forth a test for guidance in determining whether
auditors should be held liable to those not in privity:
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual
parties who rely to their detriment on inaccuratefinancial reports,
certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have
been aware that thefinancial reports were to be used for a particular
purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or
parties was intended to rely; and (3) some conduct on the part of the
accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the
accountants' understanding of that party or parties' reliance.
The court observed that different states had adopted different standards in
addressing the privity issue. Some like New Jersey and Wisconsin had thrown
it out and extended liability to any third party who could be foreseen to rely on
thefinancial statements. Others, like Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, Colorado
and Kansas follow a strict Ultramares privity test. Still others use the
Restatement approach. The New York Court of Appeals explanation of what
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Ultramares means and how liability may extend to third parties in appropriate
factual circumstances is certainly a reasonable, well-thought-out and refreshing
consideration of the issue. It is also another end of the historical thread linking
the development of today's standards to the earlier precedents.

IV. Where We Are Headed
This paper has considered the historical development of several facets of
auditor's responsibilities, standards and liabilities; the interplay between
litigation, legislation and professional standards; the broadening of the auditor's
responsibilities to its client even in the face of management's criminal
activities; the overlay of potential criminal liability to those who close their eyes
to suspicious developments and attempt blindly to follow GAAP; and, the
incredible expansion of third parties who have been held entitled to rely on
financial statements and to sue the auditor. It remains to consider what the
future may hold. It would be impossible to consider all ramifications outside the
context of a textbook or a novel.
In the ESM litigation referred to supra, Alexander Grant is being sued for
millions of dollars in damages by numerous customers of ESM including various
municipalitiesfrom around the country. The allegations of the suits incorporate
the expected common law negligence and fraud claims, and securities law
violations. They go further and allege violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),41 that Alexander Grant participated
with others through a "pattern of racketeering activity" to use ESM as an
enterprise to commit criminal acts. If successful in proving a RICO case,
damages to which the plaintiffs would be entitled would be trebled and could
theoretically approach $1 billion. While the allegations of ESM present a rather
wide departure from appropriate auditing and accounting standards, the
spectre of RICO liability for auditors in connection with "garden variety
securities fraud" cases looms ahead.
RICO was originally drafted to stem the inroads by organized crime into
legitimate businesses. It provides a civil suit remedy and has become a favorite
of the plaintiffs' bar. Last summer accountants were hoping for relief when the
Supreme Court decided Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 42 Unfortunately, the
Court refused to read RICO narrowly and ruled that its civil provisions could be
applied to virtually all commercial disputes. Justice White acknowledged the
problem, but observed that the cure "must lie with Congress." Congress,
however, has shown no serious intention to amend RICO. Certainly, on the
heels of the ESM scandal and the media attention given to the E.F. Hutton
overdrafting system, the public has not indicated that it favors a narrowing of
RICO's targets to accept "legitimate businessmen" such as auditors.
Even the foreign judicial systems and lending agencies have caught the
fever. In an Australian case, Cambridge Credit Corp. v. Hutcheson, the auditors
were found liable for a negligent audit and the plaintiff was awarded approximately $100 million (an amount exceeding the audit firm's assets as well as
those of its individual partners). In recent lawsuits in New York a foreign
government, England, and at least ninety other plaintiffs have sued Arthur
Andersen in several federal actions as a result of the collapse of John
DeLorean's automobile venture. The suits allege securities violations as well
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as RICO causes of action, and request $270 million in damages to be trebled to
nearly $800 million. The British government invested $120 million to finance
DeLorean's Belfast, Ireland factory.
Andersen issued a clean opinion for DeLorean Motor Company. The
plaintiffs allege that some of their money was diverted through a Swiss bank
account of GPD Services, Inc. (a Panamanian company) to DeLorean's
personal account. They claim as well that Andersen had ample knowledge of
questionable transactions between GPD and DeLorean's company. The plaintiffs suggest that Andersen workpapers indicate an awareness of problems
which should have brought the Natelli "suspicious inquiry doctrine" into
play.43
Dramatic, albeit not quite as dramatic, mega-suits have evolved against
auditors as a result of the Penn Square National Bank and Drysdale Government Securities scandals. The number of such lawsuits is not likely to decline in
the near future, thus making it more difficult for auditors to obtain insurance.
At the same time as these suits appear, our legislators in Washington
continue to examine the conflict-of-interest standards and other alleged
deficiencies of the profession. Representative John Dingell (D. Mich.) is
chairman of a House oversight subcommittee before which witnesses have
criticized the peer review system, the SEC's laxity in overseeing the
profession, and the fact that audit client's management hire,fire, and pay the
auditor. The latter criticism allegedly makes auditors reluctant to report
objectively on their client'sfinancial statements and/or to blow the whistle
where appropriate. In addition, certain accounting treatments which are
justifiable under GAAP have been questioned. Dingell and some of his
witnesses are unhappy with theflexibility afforded under GAAP for various
methods of depreciation, costing of inventory, as well as for alleged inconsistency of disclosure for various accounting treatments. The subcommittee has
been troubled by the issuance of clean opinions just prior tofinancial debacles
which have made front page news.
The Dingell subcommittee required the Big Eight accounting firms to
submit detailed disclosure reports relating to litigation losses as well as to
internal matters. As of yet, Dingell shows no lack of continued interest in
pursuing the oversight hearings. Not even Washington insiders are sure where
the subcommittee will end up. The ultimate questions, of course, are: Will
there be some form of more direct government regulation of the practice? Will
auditors be permitted to continue to practice in the scope of practice which is
currently enjoyed? Will more dramatic corporate governance mechanisms
become the rule?
Whatever the results of the trends, the pattern is a continuum of what has
been happening in the profession for more than 80 years. The financial
community's demand for accuratefinancial information has grown, not abated.
Auditors created a business for themselves over the past 130 years of fulfilling
the marketplace'sfinancial information needs. Indeed, the CPA's license is a
franchise to attest with respect to the market'sfinancial statements. That
marketplace, as well as the regulators responsible for oversight, had been
allocating greater and greater responsibility—with attendant legal liability—to
the profession. In many cases the expansion was based upon a now obsolete
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premise that the auditor could, in turn, assess that liability broadly through fee
structure and insurance coverage.
As the profession faces this challenge, several actions seem imperative.
The profession must reflect upon standards which are unclear, ambiguous, or
insufficient. The wide flexibility favored by George May is simply so out of favor
in several critical areas that it needs to at least be reexamined. The profession
must be even more vigilant in applying the suspicious inquiry doctrine. Several
more majorfinancial scandals where clean reports have been issued will only
spur on the regulators and the plaintiffs' bar. The profession and its representatives must be media-conscious and take initiative to get its message to the
public. It should perhaps explain the billions of dollars of financial transactions
which are successfully audited year-in-and-year-out. It should lobby and
communicate about the problems associated with RICO and the current use of
the adverse interest analysis. But, the profession is far from fatally diseased. If
history repeats itself, it will make the appropriate accommodations and move
forward.
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